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 Messay Kebede, Addis Ababa
 Development, Ethics and the Ethics of Nationalism
 In a world which exhibits so much power and yet does so little to drive back
 underdevelopment, it is not to be wondered if the thinking endeavour is shrouded
 with the impression of being confronted with the greatest enigma, with the most
 disconcerting sphinx of all times. However, concerning this most pressing and
 controversial issue of underdevelopment, of all the disciplines which study man,
 philosophy is the one which until now said the least. Is this due to simple
 insensitiveness, or to pure neglect, or to the feeling of not being directly concerned?
 Whatever the reasons may be, the simple fact that philosophy has very little to say
 regarding this colossal human tragedy, not only does not in the least render it
 innocent, but most of all, puts a question mark on it. This way of shunning the
 real world is surely puzzling for a theoretical discipline such as philosophy.
 But so harsh a judgement will undoubtedly appear as being inopportune if it
 were to be shown that the main reason which kept philosophy aloof from the issue
 of underdevelopment stems from a seemingly epistemological objection. At first
 sight, to mark off in the topic of underdevelopment an area of real philosophical
 concern does not seem feasible indeed. Underdevelopment understood as a mere
 failure of development appears to be within the compétence of the various disciplines
 of the social sciences, especially of économies, rather than that of philosophy.
 Viewed as a technical problem, it could thereby be declared outside the sphere of
 direct philosophical inquiry.
 But when one reads the works of those economists, sociologists, and anthropologists,
 who have dealt with the problem of development and underdevelopment, in their
 very disputes and lurchings, the idea that, behind the technical issues, a question
 which looks like a philosophical issue is entrenched, steadily cornes to light. This
 idea is no sooner accepted than it hints to a way of possible salvation, the
 remarkable feature of which is that it is fraught with spiritual ticklings rather than
 technical devices. Just as when ail available means fail to provide a solution, one
 Starts to rely on one's creative will, so does the man who decides to view the
 problem of underdevelopment from the philosophical perspective. He soon finds
 himself gazing at a depth of ethical frame with summoning echoes, so différent
 from the sirens of modernization and collectivisation. This paper is precisely
 pointing in such a direction: it is marked out by the graduai métamorphosés of
 development issues into ethical questions and by the growing suspicion that the
 theoretician of development may end up by becoming a moralist.
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 The Encounter of Traditionell Ethical Views
 with Theories of Economic Growth
 All philosophical textbooks, treatises and essays dealing with social life, directly
 or indirectly, feel compelled to lay out the confrontation between moral values
 and economic life. The confrontation is usually evolved under the heading: "the
 moral problems of economic life". We are thus exposed to a series of moral
 judgements which, as is right and proper of an ethical Standpoint, lend themselves
 to positive as well as to negative évaluations.
 Accordingly, it is generally admitted that in helping raise man's material
 power, industrialization has done a good deal for his perfectibility, for the development
 of his potentialities by greatly reducing the hindering effects of poverty, disease,
 and protracted subordination to natural forces. Moreover, the fact that the economic
 achievement which made industrialization possible was followed, or was accompanied,
 or even, as some would say, was caused by a démocratie outburst which dissolved
 feudal restrictions could not but arouse a general consensus equating industrialization,
 if not with the triumph, at least with a significant advancement of the values of
 equality, justice and freedom. The consensus is such that, like the moralist, when
 economists and sociologists study the transition from traditional society to mo
 dern or industrialized society, they too note, in association with industrialization,
 the "rise of the démocratie political Community".1 Henee the conclusion that for
 economic growth to be possible"the practice of assigning economic roles by
 ascription, or according to status, must be replaced by the standard of achievement."2
 It is not to be wondered, then, if the détection of a moral advancement in the
 modern world ushered in optimistic views as regards the future of humanity. The
 advent of industrialization made history meaningful to the extent that, henceforth,
 it could be conceived as the process of progress, as the irresistible move of
 humanity, however painful and tinged with crises, towards a general betterment.
 The various conceptions, ranging from liberalism to the diverse philosophies of
 history, including the Marxist one, have so largely popularized their faith in
 progress that we can venture to say that the purported bolstering effect of industrialization
 on morality was taken as a matter of fact.
 Yet we cannot conceal the equally significant fact that, alongside this mounting
 optimism, réservations with discordant effects were no less expressed. To many
 moralists, growing industrialization reflected the ascending grip of greed on men,
 the tangible triumph of materialism over spiritual values, without mentioning
 those who frankly thought of ferreting out in the accumulation of wealth, as
 Balzac said, the secret of a "crime that has never been found out ..."3 The latter
 are indeed convinced that in order to become rieh one must lie, flatter, deeeive,
 expropriate, in a word transgress all aeeepted moral rules. Even sociologists, in
 the face of the breakdown of traditional relations, have expressed in various ways
 1 Karl de Schweinitz, Jr, Industrialización and Democracy, London, 1964, p. 7
 2 Bert F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, Bombay, 1960, p. 19
 3 Balzac, "Old Goriot", The Works of Honoré de Balzac, Vol. XIV, Freeport/New York, 1971,
 p. 110
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 the dire need for a new "authoritative moral order".4 The conflict between capital
 and labour - that which in ethical terms is called the social question and which
 hinges on the question of wealth distribution - hésitant though one may be in
 agreeing with the Marxist radicalization, is none the less a pertinent case illustrating
 the divorce between ethics and economic life. This hésitation, perhaps acceptable
 when confined to the wealthy centers, becomes frankly untenable when it contemplâtes
 the vast arrays of destitution that economists call the underdeveloped areas, and
 which so distinctly render world inequality palpable.
 Still, however wide and acute the disharmony between ethics and economic
 life is judged to be, the overwhelming tendency was to stand up for optimism by
 keeping white-hot the idea of progress. More often than not each school of
 thought had its own ready-made solution. To the evils of capitalism and imperialism,
 Marxist thinking saw but one remedy: socialism, the only social Organization in
 which growth and social justice would finally reconcile. Liberalism, clinging all
 the more to the idea of progress, not only did preserve its confidence as to the
 resolution of the social question in wealthy centers, but even predicted that human
 solidarity will help overcome backwardness in the rest of the world. Here and
 there the moral obligation of rieh countries vis-à-vis the poor ones has been so
 emphatically asserted that, no doubt, it was taken as an integral part of contemporary
 consciousness.
 Transcendent and external though moral judgements on economic life may
 seem to be, yet on two aspects they were touching at the very root of the
 mechanism of economic growth. We need only recall the characteristics by which
 economists and sociologists define and oppose traditional and modern societies to
 make the suggestion viable. And if one adds the experience of underdeveloped
 countries, the suggestion turns into an evidence.
 Indeed, we saw that in defining the industrial society as an achieving one,
 theoreticians meant that it was based on merit rather than on status. This amounts
 to saying that economic development is unthinkable, at any rate cannot be sustained,
 without an overall démocratie transformation of social life, the main elements of
 which are social mobility and social justice. Poverty is congenitally associated
 with injustice and lack of freedom. No better illustration of this connection can be
 found than in the persistence of poverty in underdeveloped areas. Liberal as well
 as neo-Marxist economists, though they diverge on the explanation, share the
 same view: what sustains underdevelopment is wide social inequality. Thus
 Parmar, noting the extremely polarized texture of underdeveloped areas, draws
 the conclusion that "instead of thinking of development as a process in which
 growth will automatically bring about social justice, it should be affirmed that
 social justice should be considered a necessary precondition of growth."5 As for
 neo-Marxists, poverty is but an effect; its real cause is inequality since, as one
 such scholar puts it, "increasing social inequality is the mode of reproduction of
 the conditions of externally oriented development."6
 4 Ian Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, 1984, p. 12
 5 Samuel L. Parmar, "Seif - Reliant Development in an 'Interdependent' World", Beyond
 Dependency, New York/London, 1975, p. 14
 6 Samir Amin, Unequal Development, Sussex, 1976, p. 352
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 Beyond différences in analysis, what is generally suggested is however unmistakable:
 there is no development without some kind of ethical viability. A society is likely
 to enter into the road of economic growth only if it manifests some propensity
 towards social justice, at least by reducing the deep-seated disparities. The main
 reason, so the argument goes, for the inability of underdeveloped countries is that,
 still tied up with traditional structures and values, they have as yet failed to
 promote a more open society. In other words, if indeed progress in morality either
 conditions or accompanies economic growth, may it not be inferred that ethical
 instances, far from restricting themselves to judgements on the effects of growth,
 constitute its necessary ingrédients? Economie prowess would thus be inseparable
 from ethical soundness.
 But this is not all that there is to be said. Neo-Marxist théories have emphasized
 the idea that traditional ascriptive societies are in truth maintained by imperialist
 powers. Preserving these societies as they are, so it is argued, is the best way of
 turning them into périphéries from which more surplus can be drained without
 any serious impediment. As the ruling circles of these societies will not fail to
 find their own interest in this economic towage, what is one to conclude if not
 that, to paraphrase Frank, in indigenous societies, "the principal enemy undoubtedly
 is imperialism, the immédiate enemy is the bourgeoisie..."7 The special flavor of
 this approach springs from the présentation of economic development as something
 of which underdeveloped countries are deprived. It is, so to speak, a debarred
 right. Henee the belief that development is in the main the question of recovering
 this right. This in turn places development in the way of duty accomplishment.
 The liberal position has, on the contrary, devised the theory of modernization
 which portrays the now developed nations as pioneers and models, and by the
 same token, the underdeveloped countries as lagging societies. Put in this way,
 economic growth assumes, in the eyes of underdeveloped countries, the characters
 of a goal to be achieved, in a word of a professed teleology. For these countries to
 follow the given models becomes an aspiration, better still a duty. For instance
 the effort to economize is the first obligation to which poor countries must
 comply, for as Lewis stated, if the said effort "is not made, either because the
 desire to economize does not exist, or eise because either custom or institutions
 discourage its expression, then economic growth will not occur,"8
 In other words, since developed nations are living examples, what poor countries
 must do to arrive at the same level is fairly known. The root of the matter is rather
 on the side of the fulfilment of the necessary obligations by the underdeveloped
 countries. Thus it is because will has emerged at the forefront of development
 issues that, speaking of these countries, Rostow thought it justified to affirm: "...
 like other peoples at great moments of décision, their fate still lies substantially
 within their own hands."9 Where we were expecting the opération of objective
 laws, of a deterministic course, here is will occupying the central place!
 7 Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment, Préfacé to Revised Edition XXIII,
 New York/London, 1969
 8 W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth, London, 1963, p, 11
 9 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 1971, p. 144
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 Now to be able to struggle for a right or to raise oneself to the level of a higher
 example, in short to accomplish the prescribed duty, no doubt, certain virtues will
 be necessary. For as in any moral problem, the difficulty does not lie so much in
 the intention or desire to do good as in the realizing act, in what ethics terms the
 will. But how does the will occur? The question is indeed difficult; but an indirect
 answer is maybe possible. If will does not come automatically, may it not be due
 to the presence of resisting elements? In thus alluding to what James has called
 "inhibitive power",10 are we not equating economic achievement with moral
 conduct resisting natural impulses? From external, good or bad, judgements on
 economic life we thus insensibly slip into the question of will, that is into the very
 question of the genesis of the economic agent. This resuit allows us to directly
 examine the issue, mainly by inquiring into the values that make up the virtue of
 the entrepreneur.
 The Ethical Root of Economic Achievement
 We owe to Weber the démonstration of the connection of economic achievement
 with a specific ethos. To underline his point, it is worthwhile discussing the
 general essence of ethics so as to elicit the subterranean anchorage of economic
 achievement in ethical impulse. We know that philosophers have proposed diver
 se and often incompatible ethical doctrines. Though the task may be a difficult
 one, this diversity need not prevent us from attempting to disclose, beyond
 différences, the underlying essence, that by which alone all these doctrines deserve
 the name of ethics. We may take as a guiding point the position of Blanshard
 according to which "any question is a moral question whose décision dépends on
 a choice between values."11 A statement of this kind places the essence of ethics
 in the act of ordering or marshalling values. Neither the positing of values, nor
 the question of their origin would thus be the major concern of ethics. The proper
 essence of the latter sticks out only when a choice becomes imperative, when
 accordingly our judgement is solicited.
 However, we cannot refrain from thinking that this approach is somewhat
 restrictive as it does seem to imply that morality appears essentially in a situation
 of crisis. It may even be argued that repeated appearances of crises suggest the
 presence of an hesitating rather than a determined will. As advised by Aristotle,
 what suits virtue most is to become "habit". The essence of morality would thus
 transpire, should we suggest that it lies in the act of establishing a hierarchy of
 values. Such a définition will give us the advantage of preserving the idea of
 choice while making exceptional the exclusively crisis-driven judgements. We
 thereby confer upon the choice the attribute of establishment, or,to speak morally,
 the virtue of loyalty.
 That this analysis is impregnated with Nietzschean accents is equally noticeable.
 For what are we implying if not, as Nietzsche said referring to the morality of the
 philosopher, that it reflects "the Order of rank the innermost drives of his nature
 10 William James, Selected Papers on Philosophy, London/New York, 1961, p. 68
 11 Brand Blanshard, "Morality and Politics", Ethics and Society, London/Melbourne, 1968, p. 2
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 stand in relative to one another?"12 But in thus speaking of rank, one is also
 pointing out to the kind of duplication to which man is subjected and in relation to
 which drives are classified in terms of higher and lower, in terms of one commanding
 and another obeying, or if you will, in terms of ends and means. It would seem as
 though, from some such phenomenon of commanding and obeying, will is properly
 arousing, for "a man who wills - commands something in himself which obeys or
 which he believes obeys."13
 The task of showing to what extent this approach to morality really corresponds
 to what ethical doctrines have in common can now be dealt with. Of course, it
 will not be possible to examine all these doctrines here in detail. Let it suffice to
 point out that the essential trends do come in agreement. Moreover, our task
 would be simplified, were we to accept, following Rader, that moral doctrines are
 either "teleological"14 or "deontological"15, that they are conceived either as a
 search for happiness or as a fulfillment of obligation. From the outset one may
 well reduce all morality to the deontological by arguing that happiness too is an
 obligation. But this will hide rather than reveal the idea of rank. The best proof
 would show that in all moral views there is the establishment of a rank between
 drives, be they deontological or teleological.
 No particular difficulty is to be expected from the deontological ones. Whether
 we take the ethics implied in religious doctrines, or the morality of pure duty, as
 evolved by Kant, in both cases, the concern is the submission of sensuous drives
 to either what is believed to be divine rule or, as is the case with Kant, to pure
 rational principies. Our inquiry acquires a certain degree of complication when it
 encounters the doctrines of happiness, for in this case sensuous drives appear as
 the indispensable elements of happiness. The complication becomes undoubtedly
 greater as we go along with those views which, like the Epicurean or Utilitarian
 one, affirm categorically that the aim of ethics is "not something to be contradistinguished
 from pleasure, but pleasure itself...".16
 As regards the search for happiness in the rationalist fashion, we need only
 refer to Plato's view to observe that obedience of sensuous drives is also decreed
 as the very condition of happiness. After distinguishing the three parts in man,
 namely reason, spirit, and appetite, has not Plato defined the just man as the man
 in whom reason allied with spirit controls appetite? The just man is happy because
 "by keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale (high, middle, and low, or
 whatever they be), will in the truest sense set his house in order, and be his own
 lord and master and at peace with himself."17
 Interestingly enough, this same will of ranking emerges as the underlying
 spirit of Utilitarianism itself. It is already obvious with Epicurus: no sooner is
 pleasure termed as the "chief good" than specifically it is defined as "the freedom
 of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion".18 Needless to say, this
 12 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 20
 13 Nietzsche, op.cit., p. 30
 14 Melvin Rader, Ethics and the Human Community, 1964, p. 2
 15 Op.cit., p. 3
 16 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, London/Glasgow, 1971, p. 256
 17 Plato, The Republic, Penguin Books, 1973, p. 196
 18 Epicurus, The Classical Moralists, Boston/New York/Chicago, 1909, p. 113
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 freedom imposes on sensuous drives a sélection and restriction of such nature that
 they must be content with the strict minimum. And what is one to conclude when
 Bentham, after declaring pain and pleasure as the "two sovereign masters"19 of
 mankind, indulges in a rational calculation ranking pleasures according to their
 degree of "fecundity" and "purity".20 In Utilitarianism, pleasure, although otherwise
 pursued as the chief aim, is yet so strictly graded hierarchically that the idea of
 morality as a phenomenon of commandment and obedience cornes out rather
 reinforced.
 Let us now take up our initial problem, namely the study of the connection
 between ethics and economic life in the intention of showing how, as a proof of
 the will only, economic achievement became possible. No need to go into
 abstruse considérations; economists themselves have largely echoed Weber's
 idea of restraints on enjoyment as a condition of economic advancement. Thus
 Schweinitz notes that investment, which is a condition of economic growth, is the
 product of the "restriction of consumption, that is saving ,..".21 In more general
 terms, we can say, following Wilber, that most economists, probably in opposition
 to Marx, have tended to analyze social surplus as "the resuit of an act of abstinence
 or waiting".22 However, this Statement in no way should imply that Marxism had
 no considération for the role of abstinence in economic progress. On the contrary,
 one can even hold the opposite view by displaying the austerity of Leninism
 which, as noted by a scholar, not only emphasized "diligence, punctuality, meticulousness
 of work, and economy of materials...",23 but by radically deferring consumption
 turned socialism into a future and thereby projected state of enjoyment.
 In line with the question of the postponement of enjoyment, to broaden our
 understanding of the role of ethics, it may be of great help to recall Hegel's
 profound analysis of labour. In his study of the relationship between master and
 slave, Hegel clearly shows that the slave is able to overcome his sensuous nature
 and thus to start having a will because he works for his master. "The slave", he
 writes, "in the service of the master, works off his individualist self-will, overcomes
 the inner immediacy of appetite, and in this divestment of self and in the 'fear of
 his lord' makes 'the beginning of wisdom' - the passage to universal self
 consciousness."24 Even if labour is here taken in its forced form, it is none the less
 clearly speit out that, as an activity, it would not have been possible without man
 having to serve something other than his own selfish appetite. From the idea of
 labour as a service to a master to the Weberian conception of economic achievement
 as a duty to a divine call, the transition is so direct that one can affirm that the
 Weberian thesis on the role of Protestantism in the emergence of capitalism
 constitutes an extension of Hegel's view on the relationship between master and
 slave.
 However, although economists have stressed the role of abstinence in economic
 Jeremy Bentham, The Classical Moralists, p. 483
 Bentham, op.cit., p. 497
 Schweinitz, op.cit., p. 40
 Charles K. Wilber, The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries, 1972, p. 11
 John A. Armstrong, "Communist Political Systems as Vehicles for Modernization", Political
 Development in Changing Societies, London/Toronto, 1971, p. 140
 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, Oxford,1985, p. 175
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 growth, it cannot be said that they have remained faithful to the important factor
 of Weber's analysis, to wit the idea of call. For, as asceticism has always been
 advocated by moralists, the décisive question becomes that of knowing why the
 asceticism inspired by Protestantism alone led to economic achievement. As
 Weber sees it, in no way should the différence between ancient asceticism and
 Puritanism become a matter of doubt for in the latter "the only way of living
 acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but
 solely through the fulfilment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by
 his position in the world. That was his calling."25
 In other words, unlike traditional ethics which proposed asceticism mainly
 because it despised possession as expression of greed, Puritanism advocated the
 acquisition of wealth as a duty while restricting its enjoyment. Wealth thus
 became the expression of the fullfilment of duty, the tangible proof of the elect
 who pleases ail the more God as the restriction on enjoyment is imposed in the lap
 of opulence. As a proof of a call economic activity could grow into an enterprise,
 implying rational and rigorous methods and insatiability even by définition.
 Instead of being an adventure, that is the deployment of whatever means available
 to grab and accumulate, as mere greed would advise, acquisition of wealth could
 now be raised to the level of rational activity, and thus become an enterprise in the
 true sense of the word. Protestant ethics has introduced into the world of business
 a kind of Copernican révolution: such is the profound idea of Weber. Just as
 Thaies instead of empirically measuring or mentally analyzing the triangle discovered
 the principie of démonstration by "a positive a priori construction",26 so did the
 Protestant ethics change the acquisition of wealth into a démonstration of a call
 such as it became a methodic and sustained activity.
 Many social scientists, while recognizing the glaring merit of Weber's insight,
 have nevertheless criticized him, mainly by pointing out the particular, confined
 character of his explanation. Thus Hagen finds the thesis not persuasive in view
 of the fact that "by now we have had economic growth effectively led by Roman
 Catholics, Shintoists, Buddhists, adhérents to the Orthodox Christian faith ... and
 avowed atheists ,..".27In assuming that the "events Weber discusses were probably
 only a special case of a much more general phenomenon...",28 McClelland too
 shows the same kind of réservation. Among the critics there are also those who
 think that Weber gave too much emphasis to religious events, thus neglecting "the
 importance of the social and political context in which such changes manifest
 themselves".29
 When in this way theoreticians indicate that neither non-Protestant people nor
 even atheists were prevented from realizing economic success, it is to signify that
 the thesis of the causation of capitalism by a specific belief falls short by its very
 particularity. An ethic inspired by such a specific belief cannot provide a univer
 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, New York, 1958, p. 80
 Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, London/New York, 1969, p. 10
 Everett E. Hägen, On the Theory of Social Change, Homewood, Illinois, 1962, p. 17
 D.C. McClelland, "The Achievement Motive in Economie Growth", Political Development &
 Social Change, New York/London, 1971, p. 85
 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Penguin Books, 1974,
 p. 52
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 sal explanation, as it seems to bar similar conduct in people with différent beliefs.
 As concerns those who accuse Weber of neglecting the social context, their
 objection is in a way similar since they are but demanding that the religious aspect
 be taken as an element in a more global phenomenon, as a particular reflection of
 a general move towards economic development. Henee our question: what is this
 general trend of which the Protestant ethics should be an aspect?
 According to McClelland, the generality of the trend is characterized by a
 particular increase in the need for achievement. Through the impulse of a child
 rearing System which emphasized self-reliance, the epoch was lifted up by a
 characteristic increase in the need for achievement. This psychological rather
 than religious explanation, while on the one hand it ensures that "the key characteristics
 of the Protestant Reformation was its emphasis on self-reliance",30 on the other,
 being of a general nature, it renders possible the explanation of "economic
 development in ancient Greece, in modern Japan...".31
 Hagen, for his part, proposes an explanation which gives more room to social
 conditions inasmuch as the need for economic achievement is surmised to intensify
 as a resuit of a withdrawal of status respect caused by the disruption of traditional
 social order. Those groups who have lost their previous status tend, in the long
 run, to evolve a creative or achieving personality which is none other than the
 expression of their desire to reconquer their position. They would rather select
 the economic field since as a rule, while being more open, it also leads to rapid
 social récognition. "The pressure of withdrawal of status respect", writes Hagen,
 "on authoritarian parents will create a home environment leading to progressively
 increasing retreatism over a period of several générations. Out of this, still later,
 creative personality is apt to arise."32
 The general approach is thus clear: it is to intimate that in a closed society, that
 is ruled by customs and traditions, innovation should be expected to come from
 people having a déviant personality. The special role that migrants have played in
 accelerating economic growth in various parts of the world could not but strengthen
 this idea. Migrants are not only those who are more apt to question traditional
 manners, but in their desire to assert themselves, they are also those with a
 conquering will. An observation such as this led Hoselitz to the view that "new
 forms of economic activity arise in connection with the behaviour of certain
 individuáis who départ from traditional customs and practices."33
 To summarize, then, we can say that all these theoreticians, while in the main
 agreeing with Weber's idea of linking the emergence of capitalism with the
 appearance of a déviant personality, have endeavoured to give it a more universal
 dimension such as it would include the industrialization of those countries which
 had no Protestant background. Even if no general agreement is observable as to
 the cause of the déviant personality, there seems to be a consensus in the understanding
 that economic achievement is willed whenever people or groups of people, feeling
 either insecure or being effectively declassed, harbour the détermination to preserve
 or conquer a higher social position.
 30 McClelland, op.cit., p. 85
 31 Ibid.
 32 Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, p. 200
 33 Hoselitz, op.cit., p. 23
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 Need we stress the insufficiency of this explanation? For, why should déviant
 mentality necessarily lean towards economic process? As noted by a scholar,
 "achievement motivation may seek a variety of outlets...";34 as seen in past
 history, war, religious fervour, aristocratie exploit, etc., could serve as so many
 catharses. Explaining the drive towards economic performance by a special
 ethics was actually the force of Weber's position. This ethics, which was but an
 event in human history, interpreted acquisition as a duty, as a response to a
 calling. Such was indeed the depth of Weber's analysis: a specific ethics explaining
 a no less specific event, to wit capitalism. As Nisbet puts it: "It was the great
 achievement of Weber, however,to demónstrate irrefutably that the rise of capitalism
 in the West cannot be explained in (the) genetic, stage-producing-stage fashion.
 Apart fromthe discontinuity represented by the impact of Protestantism upon the
 medieval economy, there is no evidence that the economy would not have continued,
 despite its alleged internai contradictions, for a long period of time."35 In other
 words, in Weber's view, capitalism was an event, a unique phenomenon, and not,
 as in the Hegelian or Marxist fashion, a necessary moment of a general progressi
 ve trend. True, a special case, namely British industrialization, was later on
 extended to other countries, but originally it was neither particularization, nor a
 signal, far less a necessary moment of a general drive.
 Pertinent though this standpoint is, we cannot for long remain insensitive to
 the objection mentioned earlier according to which economic growth need not be
 tied up with a specific religious belief. A considération such as this leaves us with
 two choices only. Either we agree to take the Protestant ethics itself as an
 expression of a more profound tendency, without however falling back into the
 stage-producing-stage mode of thinking, or we consent to a radically eventful
 view, thus turning British industrialization into an event which led to various
 repercussions, among which is the spreading of industrialization to other countries.
 There is no doubt, however, that we would delve into a deeper root, were we to
 show that a common drive actually animâtes the alternative. May it not be, then,
 that some calling, religious perhaps, ethical in any case, must have been at the
 source of industrialization? If such is the case, then can one fail to see that, of ail
 the drives so far proposed, only nationalism can pride itself of being a calling with
 universal validity?
 The Ethics of Nationalism
 No need to beat about the bush, there is every reason for supposing a similar spirit
 in the Protestant déviation, as analyzed by Weber, and in what is generally called
 nationalist aspiration. Thus, Gellner referred the "two elements of the rational
 spirit of which Weber was clearly aware (orderliness and efficiency)" to "something
 deeper",36 namely to nationalist aspiration. The reason is obvious: nationalist
 34 Michael Argyle, "The Social Psychology of Social Change". Social Theory and Economic
 Change, London/New York, 1967, p. 96
 35 Robert Nisbet, "The Problem of Social Change", Social Change, Oxford, 1972, p. 25
 36 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca/London, 1983, p. 21
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 drive has an equally dissolving effect on traditional societies. By demanding
 social intégration and mobility, it is indeed activating the dissolution, in traditional
 societies, of their "hierarchically related sub - worlds, and the existence of special
 privileged facts...",37 all of which are impediments to the fostering of rationality.
 Only in a world where privilèges and status ascriptions are declining and where
 more and more equalization is on the ascendant can rational view and practice
 prevail. For the need for achievement to arouse, there must be something to
 achieve, a merit to conquer; in a word the need is dépendent on a open society.
 Then can one, as yet, fail to remark the reciprocal link existing between
 democracy, industrialization and nationalism? Earlier, in what scholars had
 conveyed as a necessary condition for economic achievement, namely the dissolution
 of traditional society, we detected a démocratie advancement. Seeing what
 nationalism expresses, namely the need for intégration and equalization, the
 replacement of the hierarchical society by the society of the masses, the mutual
 connection of democracy and nationalism can no longer be denied. It is on the
 dissolution of traditional society that the ideology of national-state has thriven.
 There remains, however, a particular difficulty. Even if the link between
 nationalism and democracy be granted, many scholars would none the less hesitate
 in speaking of an ethics of nationalism, without mentioning those who, in the light
 of recent experience, would frankly equate nationalism with anti-democratic state
 of mind. The facts seem to be there: far from inspiring ethical conduct, nationalism
 has unleashed here and there the most irrational tendencies of man. By associating
 man's dignity with a cultural or ethnie specificity, by thus suppressing his universalist
 endowments, not only has nationalism driven men into colonial adventures and
 devastating wars, but it has also inspired the most inhumane racist doctrines and
 practices. When a regime is brandishing nationalist commitment, is it not, if
 anything, to suppress internal démocratie aspirations? The problem is undeniable:
 if nationalism carried démocratie demands, how comes it, then, that it became the
 cause of the most tragic moments of human history?
 But any radical condemnation is no sooner accepted than it comes up against
 itself, for if no good has come out of nationalism, one will be all the more
 embarrassed to explain any of the great achievements of modern history. Though
 liberalism as well as Marxism had in various times ushered in the irremediable
 decline of nationalism, the one because it considered nationalist feeling as a dark
 force in man, the other because it saw in nationalism an instrument of class rule,
 all this, to quote Gellner, proved to be "utter nonsense".38 Nationalism, on the
 cor.trary, held on as the very force which all explanations of the world as we know
 it today had to reckon with. If already liberalism has little to say in favour of the
 purported decline of nationalism, then how much less so may Marxist theory, in
 seeing that the national question accounts for all the shifts and divisions which
 have shaken the socialist world. How can one attribute to such an evil force the
 power of determining the course of history without condemning altogether this
 history as the work of an obscure force?
 37 Ibid.
 38 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, London, 1964, p. 149
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 Moreover, the fact that an idea or a belief leads to reprehensible conséquences
 does not imply that it was all evil or unethical. If such had been the case, no one
 of the existing religious beliefs would have crossed the threshold of immorality.
 More specifically, whether one agréés or not with the thesis that the Protestant
 ethics generated capitalism, one would not, however, think of counting as an
 objection the tremendous human suffering caused by the growth of capitalism.
 The truth is that no one idea, however generous and noble, can eschew the ordeal
 of disfigurement as soon as it tries to insert itself into reality. Nor can it be
 protected from being used as a cover for harmful design. What is tragic in human
 life is not that evil is combating good, but that it does so by aping good itself.
 Thus to deplore the distortions of nationalism is not enough, there is also the
 obligation to reflect on its essence. We have already stressed the démocratie
 inspiration of nationalism through its dissolving effect on traditional societies.
 More so than this disruptive action, what is most relevant to our purpose is the
 congruence between nationalist aspiration and the desire to do business. Ward
 remarks that the nation - state ideology is a form of unity which is based neither
 on blood nor on dynastie rule; it is rather the incarnation of the "values of
 business".39 This is ail too obvious: the nation - state idea expresses the triumph
 of cities, with their busy markets, over feudal rights. In order to operate rationally,
 these cities more and more required protection and the establishment of common
 laws. This trend was none other than the one bringing to an end the rule of
 privilèges and hierarchy. The nation - state is therefore a framework for business
 requirement: it provides protection and ensures overall orderliness and social
 mobility, these being the conditions by which investment is encouraged, privilèges
 abolished and merit rewarded. Thus ail the facts conspire; as Gellner said:
 "modem society is not mobile because it is egalitarian, it is egalitarian because it
 is mobile."40
 However, the correspondence between business drives and nationalist aspiration,
 as couched by Gellner, otherwise acceptable as a bare Statement of link, becomes
 dubious when it is meant to signify that the nation - state is but a product of
 economic need, or as he himself said, that "it is the need for growth which
 generates nationalism, not vice - versa".41 Indeed, put in this way, the position of
 the author differs little from the ordinary credo of economic determinism. And
 what is most questionable about economic determinism is that, as we saw, it can
 hardly be reconciled with the conduct of history. Industrialization is an event, an
 épisode; it cannot be viewed as a determined outeome. Precisely, herein lies the
 remarkable fact: that which is impossible for economic determinism is sheer
 potency for nationalism to the extent that it can be said that nationalism rather
 than economic need explains industrializaiton.
 Let us hasten to add that the merit of discovering the eminent role of nationalism
 in the process of industrialization belongs unquestionably to Rostow. His discovery
 is in fact twofold. On the one hand, there is the reactive nationalism of those
 countries which were either overtaken, like France, or late corners, such as
 Germany, Japan and Russia. The early industrialization of Britain, with its
 39 Barbara Ward, Nationalism and Ideology, New York, 1966, p. 46
 40 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 24-5
 41 Gellner, Thought and Change, p. 168
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 growing material power, was no doubt perceived by these countries as a threat
 which must be countered by a resolute industrialization. On that account, speaking
 of these countries, Rostow can write: "Men holding effective authority or influence
 have been Willing to uproot traditional societies not, primarily, to make more
 money but because the traditional society failed - or threatened to fail - to protect
 them from humiliation by foreigners."42 Let us admit that the idea of explaining
 the industrialization of these countries by the spur of reactive nationalism gives a
 more striving and heroic sense to history than the one which is cutting it down to
 the level of mere product of determinism, be it economic or ideal.
 On the other hand, there is the suggestion that British religious dissent, in
 which Weber saw the source of capitalism, is itself a form, a manifestation of
 •reactive nationalism. The suggestion is all the more appealing as all the major
 events of British history tended to pour into such Channels as will contribute to the
 formation of a distinct and insular personality. Its struggle against the Church of
 Rome and the Spanish power which was backing it, its rivalries with France and
 with the Dutch financial and maritime power testify that British nationalism was
 particularly wrought by successive events. This allows to say that "British
 nationalism, transcending caste loyalties, created by a series of intrusions and
 challenges to a lesser island off a dominant mainland, may have been a major
 force in creating relatively flexible social matrix within which the process of
 building the preconditions for take - off was hastened in Britain...".43
 In the light of this remark, a number of interesting theoretical extensions are
 possible. The first bears on the connection between nationalism and inclination
 towards business. In discussing Gellner's view, which explained nationalism by
 economic need, we proposed an inversed order of "causation". The main reason
 is now clear: the threat of external powers on traditional societies, therefore
 reactive nationalism accounts for their move towards industrialization. Let us
 grant British industrialization as an instance of nationalist response and we will
 have one after the other, as diverse nationalist repercussions, the series of divergent
 industrializing efforts made by various countries to respond to the British challenge.
 Not the desire for economic gain but foreign challenge44 has everywhere triggered
 42 Rostow, op.cit., pp. 26-7
 43 Rostow, op.cit., p.35
 44 Reactive nationalism seems to be at the very root of Marxism itself. Indeed, Marx's rage
 against German spéculative philosophy leads one to suppose that it stems from the perception
 of Germany being overtaken by both Britain and France. Thus criticizing Kant's theory of
 good will, especially its pretensión to be beyond material interests, Marx writes: "While the
 French bourgeoisie, by means of the most colossal révolution that history has ever known, was
 achieving domination and conquering the Continent of Europe, while the already politically
 emancipated English bourgeoisie was revolutionising industry and subjugating India politically,
 and all the rest of the world commercially, the impotent German burghers did not get any
 further than 'good will'." (The German Ideology, London, 1974, p. 97). For our part, we will
 not hesitate to extend the argument to the theoreticians of the French Revolution. For sure,
 their deep inspiration, as is clearly shown by the attitude of Voltaire and Montesquieu, points
 to the early British take - off. These words of Voltaire furnish a direct proof: "Commerce,
 which has brought wealth to the citizenry of England, has helped to make them free, and
 freedom has developed commerce. By means of it the nation has grown great; it is commerce
 that little by little has strengthened the naval forces that make the English the masters of the
 seas." (Philosophical Letters, 1961, p. 39)
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 off industrialization: such is the profound idea of Rostow. That the history of
 industrialization displays diversity, that not only nations have followed différent
 paths, but that they do occupy différent positions, some being advanced while
 others are lagging behind, in a word that this history did not take a unilinear
 direction is, need we insist, an expression of reactive nationalism, of the diversity
 of the efforts made to take up the challenge.
 Nor can we fail to notice the close affinity existing between this theory of
 nationalism and the position of those theoreticians who tried to explain economic
 growth by a characteristic cultural change. Thus when Hagen speaks of the
 withdrawal of status respect, when McClelland deduces from the practice of seif -
 reliance an increasing need for achievement, or when Hoselitz stresses the particular
 pathos of migrants, in a word, when a déviant personality appears, directly or
 indirectly, the necessity to take up a challenge transpires as the underlying cause.
 In this respect, however, what is most interesting to remark is that, even
 though the founding ethical impulse was implicit in their analysis, ail these
 theoreticians were content with a kind of psychological explanation. Even
 Rostow saw in nationalism a mere political attitude and refrained from getting
 to its ethical root. Such would have been, however, the only way by which one
 could still preserve the illuminating idea of Weber without reducing it to a
 particular belief. The more direct the récognition of the ethical root of nationalism,
 the greater would have been the opportunity to salvage the idea of call, of
 economic achievement as duty. What in this respect has vitiated the analyses of
 many scholars is that, given a certain psychological modification or reaction,
 they thought that there is enough motive to act in the projected way. Without
 entering into the controversial issue of psychological causation, without either
 mentioning the fact that the said psychological change in no way provides the
 real reason, hoping to be in line with facts about men, we simply believe that, of
 ail the motivations, ethos has more power over men. It is indeed so even for the
 theoreticians that we have mentioned so far, since ail of them make the psychological
 change dépendent on the notion of challenge that should be overcome. Must we
 not conclude that the change is but the fulfilment of an instance which, above
 ail, must be perceived and accepted as a duty ? Short of ethical
 receptivity, no psychological change, it should be admitted, is likely to occur.
 In other words, so much would be gained if only we could see in dissent, which
 is generally believed to be conducive to economic achievement, an expression of
 nationalism. In doing so, we preserve, first, the idea of call. For as a will to
 respond to a challenge, nationalism is particularly prone to a calling attitude.
 Hirschemeier noticed this when, dealing with Japanese nationalism, he wrote that
 a "new element appeared that resembled, in its function, the mentality of the
 Puritans. It was nothing religious, not a calling by God; it was rather a calling by
 the nation, by the emperor."45 Secondly, with the call, there cornes the notion of
 duty, and with it the will to industrialization. Only as duty, therefore as an object
 of will, can industrialization be effective. To note the psychological prickling,
 the desire to achieve is one thing, to argue that it leads to effective accomplishment
 is another. The restrictions on enjoyment, the adoption of rational methods, the
 45 Johannes Hirschmeier, The Origins of Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan, Harvard, 1968, p. 204
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 acceptance of an open society, in a word all those moral virtues which render
 economic achievement possible cannot be fostered otherwise than as a resuit of a
 call by which alone, not simply desiring, but above all proving, becomes a
 necessity.
 We can thus sum up our analysis by stating that nationalism was, and probably
 still is, to economic growth what the Copernican révolution was to the development
 of sciences. Nowhere is the opposition of this view to the prevailing théories of
 development more acute than in the question of histórica! determinism. Most
 théories of development, because they are, directly or indirectly, influenced by
 Hegel or Marx, conceive development as a low - governed process, as a move
 animated by inner necessity. To this necessity we owe the view that the new
 society, as Marx said, grows out from "the womb of the old society".46 Thus there
 is a given progressive, stage - producing - stage movement, the very one which
 allows Hegel to define development as a process "by which that only is explicit
 which is already implicitly présent".47 However, facts do not suggest that
 industrialization has proceeded thus. Far from being the product of an inner
 directional drive, it was rather the outcome of reactive nationalism, itself understood
 as a moral uprising trying to cope with a challenge. Instead of a teleologically
 moving history, we thought that conceiving progress in ethical terms would invite
 one to express it in terms of rupture. Only as an intermittent break - through, and
 no more as a universal procession, can the idea of progress be in accordance with
 the facts of reality.
 In place of the unilinear history we are thus pleading for a creative history, for
 thaï history which, as Bergson said of the évolution of nature, would develop "in
 the form of sheaf, creating by its very growth, divergent directions among which
 its Ímpetus is divided."48 In effect, we disclosed in nationalism a creative impulse
 launching history into divergent lines, ail of which represented so many ways by
 which challenge was overeóme. Everything appears as though history were
 prevented by nationalist curving from moving along a given directional line,
 perhaps to avert the inevitable exhaustion inherent in ail uniformity. For, as
 stated by Levi - Strauss, it is "impossible to imagine manking pursuing a single
 way of life for, in such a case, mankind would be ossified."49
 If no directional force controls history, if ail progress is but a victory of an
 intermittent and individualized effort, the evidence seems to be that, contrary to
 the prevailing théories explaining man as a product of history, it is history which
 is the product of man. Indeed, neither mere psychological change, still less the
 action of objective material forces will ever make room for the notion of man as
 maker of his own history. The only way out is to conceive history as the
 expression of his will, of his ethical motivations. This in turn renders man's
 freedom tangible at the very root of history. To the most appalling question, to
 the very one which would demand us to explain, in default of inner necessity, why
 46 Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, Penguin Books, 1975,
 p. 68
 47 Hegel, Hegel's Logic, Oxford, 1975, p. 224
 48 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, Westport, Connecticut, 1975, p. 110
 49 Claude Lévi - Strauss, "Cultural Dynamics and Values", Approaches to the Science of Socio -
 Economic Development, Paris, 1971, p. 263
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 the world is as it is, we would thus have the courage to say that the world is
 exactly as men have wanted it. Let there be no misunderstanding: the world is
 never as we desire it, but by rediscovering the old wisdom of Epicurus who
 insisted on distinguishing the things which dépend on us from those which do not,
 it is possible to say that the world understood as depending on our reactions,
 therefore as an ethical phenomenon, is exactly as we have willed it. The discovery
 of ethical issues at the very center of development théories, as it revives an old
 wisdom, turns this same wisdom into a permanent one. For it confirms a line of
 contemporary wisdom, the very one which led Sartre to State that "man is nothing
 eise but that which he makes of himself'50 and that thereby "there is no determinism
 - man is free, man is freedom".51 The notion that man is responsible for
 everything makes economic development into an act of his freedom, into an
 outcome of what he wills, of the hierarchy of his drives. Should we not, then, try
 to familiarize ourselves with the idea that the proper expression for development
 is perhaps not science, but ethics of development?
 That, at any rate, seems to us the only way endowed with the practical
 possibility of overcoming the major omission of our time, namely underdevelopment.
 Whatever is the socio - cultural explanation of underdevelopment, whether it is
 due to the effects of backwardness or economic dependency, the fact remains that
 no salvation is possible without the Willing, or to use James' expression, without
 the "heroic mind".52 In this case, the heroic mind is the one which first of ail
 admits that everything dépends on it. No determinism, so it says, can explain the
 presence of wealth here and its absence there; ñor can it provide the means to
 remove poverty. Because it does not rely on the forces of determinism, it
 immediately hoists itself at the level of the ethical. By so doing, instead of trying
 to activate a mechanism, it is getting ready to assume a duty, and thus to generate
 new possibilities by making the necessary sacrifices, or better still by realizing
 the imperative ranking of drives.
 Precisely, the théories of development proposed so far, from modernization to
 socialism, ail fail because in no way do they trace out the way leading to a Willing
 posture. Modernization theory advocates, in the last instance, the solution of
 cultural change through the instillation of Western values and institutions into the
 still backward countries. For this, it relies on a form of causation which, either
 through direct diffusion or environmental determinism, is supposed to imprégnate
 the backward culture with the values and methods of modernity. In ail cases,
 there is a récipient and a donor, and it is assumed that by a kind of printing process
 all that exists in the donor will appear in the récipient. Need we say that this
 causal approach overlooks the simple fact that, as we are dealing with men, that is
 with spontaneous and self - directed beings, the mere inculcation of ideas does
 not necessarily bring about the will, any more than the gathering of organs will
 generate life. The free initiative of the récipient is here essential. Short of it, what
 we have is caricature, leading to a mere symbolic usage of modernity, as is most
 probably the case with underdevelopment.
 50 Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, London, 1987, p. 28
 51 Sartre, op.cit., p. 34
 52 W. James, op.cit., p. 83
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 It goes without saying that the importance of nationalism Springs from its
 possibility of providing a framework for cultural change such as it is in accord
 with freedom. It makes change possible as self-détermination, and modernization,
 instead of acculturation, becomes properly renaissance. Indeed, though many
 authors have taken note of the resurgence of the past whenever people are about to
 effect a major change, and thus, as Marx said, "precisely in such epochs of
 revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the spirits of the past to help them"53
 it has not occurred to them that this recourse to past values is maybe due to the
 fact that in matters of mental phenomena change can only be a renaissance. Such
 should have been, however, the natural conclusion, seeing that the freedom of
 mind can allow change only as self - détermination, that is as ensuring a résurrection.
 So that if, as Gellner noted it, "nationalism usually conquers in the name of a
 putative folk - culture",54 one need not be surprised since such is the way by
 which change can occur in accordance with the requirement of freedom. In other
 words, through nationalism, that is through the framework of self - détermination,
 the récipient is transfigured into a Willing culture, into a demiurge of its own
 drives, exalted as it is by the spur of duty accomplishment.
 Interestingly enough, this same injunction can be maintained as regards those
 scholars who propose socialism as a solution to underdevelopment. For, as the
 suggested development scheme relies mainly on material incentives, we do not
 see how the theory, left to itself, will enhance the achieving appetite, any more
 than we do not see how it would justify the restraint on enjoyment. Leninism, as
 we saw, tried to overcome this deficiency by transfiguring socialism into a
 deferred enjoyment, into something resembling a call. Accordingly, may it not be
 suggested that by referring to a "call", Leninism had since then ceased to be an
 exclusively economico - political doctrine of development? For without the call,
 the restraint of enjoyment, unable to become a need for démonstration, or to use a
 Hegelian term, for "objectification", would rather incite the feeling of unsatisfaction
 and inadaptation. And as we said, in no way is greed the way towards development.
 The latter stems not from the need to satisfy, but from the need to accomplish a
 task. Only as an enterprise, or as it must be clear by now, as an ethical undertaking
 by which greed is spiritualized, sublimated, can the sacrifices, the ranking of
 drives, be feit, not as lack, but as "will to power".
 Author's Address: Dr. Messay Kebede, P.O.Box 102 258, Addis Ababa, Äthiopien
 53 Marx, Surveys from Exile, Penguin Books, 1973, p. 146
 54 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 57
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